University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 2014 | Issue 1

Article 16

2014

Catching up to the Supreme Court: Applying the
Arbaugh-Bowles Test to Title VII's Presentment
Requirement
Andrew C. Adair
Andrew.Adair@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Adair, Andrew C. (2014) "Catching up to the Supreme Court: Applying the Arbaugh-Bowles Test to Title VII's Presentment
Requirement," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2014: Iss. 1, Article 16.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2014/iss1/16

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 2014 U. Chi. Legal F. 723 2014

Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Dec 8 00:12:52 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0892-5593

Catching Up to the Supreme Court: Applying
the Arbaugh-Bowles Test to Title VIi's
Presentment Requirement
Andrew C. Adairt

INTRODUCTION

It was evident in 1964 that achieving widespread
compliance with the Civil Rights Act, and therein, eradicating
workplace discrimination, would prove difficult.' Therefore,
Congress sought to make it easy for untrained litigants of
limited
means to bring claims
asserting workplace
discrimination. 2 Accordingly, Congress designed the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) process to offer
such litigants an opportunity to raise concerns with the agency,
pursue voluntary conciliation with the employer, and achieve
curative results for the claimant. 3 Unfortunately, judge-imposed
procedural restrictions jeopardize the effectiveness of the EEOC
process and limit the opportunity for claimants to seek relief.
Title VII delineates unlawful employment practices and
provides the process through which victims can claim
violations. 4 Included in that process are requirements to pursue
a claim with the EEOC prior to bringing a suit in federal court.5
Presentment is among the requirements that courts have
extrapolated from this section. This rule requires a party to
adequately present an issue to an agency before seeking judicial

t BA 2009, Northwestern University; JD Candidate 2015, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 See Newman u Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc, 390 US 400, 401 (1968).
2
See Babrocky v Jewel Food Co, 773 F2d 857, 864 (7th Cir 1985) (explaining the
liberal standard that judges should apply while assessing the presentment requirement
on a claim brought by a layperson plaintiff).

4

FordMotor Company v EEOC, 458 US 219, 228 (1982).
See 28 USC § 2000e.

See 28 USC

§ 2000e-5.
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review. 6 This Comment does not challenge the rule itself.
Indeed, presentment adds substantial benefit to Title VII
enforcement. 7 However, some circuits have abused this
requirement by treating it as jurisdictional. 8 In so doing, courts
risk dismissing otherwise proper claims for relief without using
their equitable discretion to evaluate a claim. This unfairly
burdens the layperson claimants that Title VII sought to
empower, who may not have the legal acumen to comply
precisely with administrative procedure.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence on jurisdiction provides sufficient guidance to
resolve the circuit split in favor of treating presentment as nonjurisdictional. Part I provides a summary of subject matter
jurisdiction, explains the problem with the way courts have used
the doctrine, and describes the Supreme Court's efforts to curtail
such improper use. Part II examines jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional treatment of exhaustion requirements under Title
VII, including timeliness, receipt of a right-to-sue notice, and
presentment. Part III argues that the Supreme Court's recent
jurisdiction jurisprudence established a test that should be used
to evaluate whether or not presentment is jurisdictional going
forward. Part IV applies that test to demonstrate that
presentment is not a jurisdictional requirement. In sum,
although the Supreme Court did not rule specifically on
presentment, its recent decisions on jurisdiction sufficiently
instruct circuit courts to avoid jurisdictional treatment of the
requirement.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
This Comment suggests in Part III that the recent effort by
the Supreme Court to bring clarity to the concept of jurisdiction
provides a clear path for defining presentment as nonjurisdictional. Before making that argument, Part I will review
subject matter jurisdiction, describe the profligate use of

Charles Alan Wright and Charles H. Koch, Jr, 33 Federal Practice and Procedure
(1st ed).
See Part II.C.
8 See Part II.C.2, citing, for example, Alfano u Costello, 294 F3d 365, 381 (2d Cir
2002); Brown u Departmentof Public Safety, 446 Fed Appx 70, 73 (9th Cir 2011); Dalvit u
United Airlines, Inc, 359 Fed Appx 904, 911 (10th Cir 2009).
6

§ 83
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"jurisdiction" by courts, and summarize the Court's recent
jurisprudence to stop such use.
A.

Background

Subject matter jurisdiction determines whether or not a
court has the power to consider a particular matter.9 As the
Supreme Court explained, "jurisdiction is power, and in its
absence, the court's only function is to dismiss the case."1 0 Thus,
establishing jurisdiction is a preliminary and critical function
for any party seeking relief in the federal courts. The
Constitution provides the absolute limit of judicial power, but it
does not vest all of that power in the district courts." Instead,
the Constitution vested in Congress the power to create inferior
courts and grant judicial authority, 12 provided that authority
does not exceed the bounds of the Constitution. 13 Therefore,
although federal question jurisdiction-the power to hear cases
arising under laws of the United States-is within the
Constitutional limit of the judicial authority that Congress can
grant,14 Congress did not grant jurisdiction over federal question
cases to the district courts until 1875.15
At first glance, district courts appear to have jurisdiction
over claims that arise under federal law. Unfortunately,
jurisdiction it is not that simple. Most federal laws contain
several requirements for bringing a claim. The challenge for
courts is determining whether those requirements relate to
subject matter jurisdiction or are elements of the claim for relief.
Federal question jurisdiction encapsulates Title VII, which
is a law of the United States. Moreover, Title VII specifically
9 Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (3d ed).
10 Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction,54 Hastings L J 1613, 1615

(2003) (summarizing several Supreme Court cases).
" Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3502 (3d ed).
12 US Const Art III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
s Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803) (holding a statute unconstitutional that
purported to grant original jurisdiction beyond that granted in Article III of the
Constitution).
14 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ....
).
1" Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat 470, codified at 28 USC § 1331 ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.").
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grants federal courts the authority to adjudicate civil actions
brought thereunder. 16 However, a case that arises under Title
VII invokes a federal law that requires administrative
exhaustion as a prerequisite.17 This raises the critical question:
does Title VII incorporate administrative exhaustion as a
jurisdictional prerequisite, or is administrative exhaustion an
element of a claim for relief? As explored below, this
determination has serious implications including access to
justice, efficiency and fairness, and the constitutionality of
adjudication.
B.

The Profligate Use of "Jurisdiction"

Complicating things further, "courts have been less than
meticulous" on
the
distinction between
jurisdictional
prerequisites and non-jurisdictional requirements. 18 Multiple
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have
acknowledged careless use of jurisdictional terms in a
descriptive sense, rather than a legal sense. 19 Often, this
mistake involves referring to claim-processing rules, which are
subject to waiver, as jurisdictional requirements, which are
not. 20
Regrettably, the rhetorical distinction between the two
conditions precedent pales in comparison to the difference of
practical effect between them. Jurisdictional requirements are
not subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. 2 1 The
16 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(3) ("Each United States district court
and each United
States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.").
17 See Logsdon v Turbines, Inc, 399 F Appx 376, 378 (10th
Cir 2010).
18 Arbaugh v Y&H Corp, 546 US 500, 511 (2006), citing, for example, Hishon v King
& Spalding, 467 US 69 (1984) (noting that the district court's reasoning made clear
jurisdiction-based dismissal was for failure to state a claim under Title VII, not on
jurisdictional grounds).
19 See Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 90 (1998) (explaining
that jurisdiction has been a "word of many, too many, meanings") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Zipes v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 455 US 385, 395 (1982) ("Although
our cases contain scattered references to the timely-filing requirement as jurisdictional,
the legal character of the requirement was not at issue in those cases."); Francisv City of
New York, 235 F3d 763, 767-68 (2d Cir 2000) ("It is true that in [a prior decision] we
referred, in passing, to Title VII's exhaustion requirements as a matter of jurisdiction,
echoing similar references in prior decisions. . . . [T]his characterization, however, played
no part in our holding[s].") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis removed).
20 Kontrick v Ryan, 540 US 443,
456 (2004).
21 See Zipes, 455 US 385, 393 (1982); Sebelius
v Auburn Regional Medical Center,
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absence of waiver means that subject matter jurisdiction can be
challenged, or raised sua sponte by the judge, at any point
during litigation. 22 The corresponding procedural implications
could have adverse consequences on litigants, especially
disadvantaged plaintiffs.23 For example, treating a requirement
as jurisdictional would place the burden of establishing
jurisdiction on plaintiffs, increasing the difficulty and cost of
bringing a suit. 24 Moreover, procedural rules such as waiver
were introduced for efficiency and fairness. 25 Sidestepping these
rules may waste judicial resources, for instance, by allowing
challenges to jurisdiction to be raised for the first time on
appeal, potentially rendering the entire previous trial
superfluous. 26 On the other hand, an erroneous exercise of
jurisdiction means that a court is acting outside of its authority
and therein, in violation of the Constitution. 27
C.

The Supreme Court's Effort to Bring Clarity to the
Jurisdiction Doctrine

The Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of
jurisdictional determinations, recently issued a series of
decisions seeking to correct the haphazard use of jurisdictional
terms and bring more clarity to the doctrine. 28 One of the first
cases in the series considered whether Title VII's numerosity

133 S Ct 817, 824 (2013).
22 Arbaugh, 546 US at 506-07 (discussing the procedural
differences between
challenges to jurisdiction and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
23 Katherine
A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on
"Jurisdictional"Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require That Allegations be
Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 Geo Mason Civ Rts L
J 213, 248-52 (2011) ("A subject matter jurisdiction objection is a much more powerful
tool for a defendant . . . than a mere affirmative defense.").
24 Id at 249, citing Ashoff v City of Ukiah, 130 F3d 409, 410 (9th Cir 1997).
25 Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331, 356-57 (2006)
(exploring the importance
of procedural rules in an adversarial system, in which the parties are responsible for
raising issues).
26 See Henderson v Shinseki, 131 S
Ct 1197, 1202 (2011).
27 Steel Co, 523 US at 89 (explaining that jurisdiction
refers to "the courts' statutory
or constitutional power to adjudicate the case") (emphasis omitted).
28 See Henderson, 131 S Ct at 1202 ("[W]e have tried
in recent cases to bring some
discipline to the use of this term. We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as
jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity."); Auburn Regional, 133 S
Ct at 824 (citing other cases). For a more thorough examination of efforts to bring more
clarity to jurisdiction, see generally Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional
Clarity, 97 Va L Rev 1 (2011).
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requirement, which only applies Title VII to employers with
more than fifteen employees, constituted a jurisdictional
prerequisite for suit.
In Arbaugh u Y&H Corp,29 the plaintiff was a
bartender/waitress who brought sexual harassment and
constructive discharge claims against the restaurant's owners. 30
After a two-day jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. 31 The defendants subsequently filed a posttrial motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
asserting for the first time that the company did not meet the
statutory definition of an employer because it had fewer than
fifteen employees. 32 Though critical of the defendant's delay in
raising the jurisdictional challenge, the district court allowed
discovery on the matter, vacated its judgment, and dismissed
the discrimination claim with prejudice. 33 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "resolve
conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals . . . von whether Title

VII's employee-numerosity requirement [] is jurisdictional or
simply an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief." 35
The Supreme Court reversed, taking care to distinguish
between jurisdictional requirements and elements of a claim for
relief. 36 The key difference between the types of conditions
precedent, according to the Court, is the language with which
Congress created them. 37 In holding that the employeenumerosity requirement is not jurisdictional, the Court
articulated a "readily administrable bright line" to enhance
clarity of the subject:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute's scope shall count as
29

546 US 500 (2006).

so Id at 507.

" Id at 508 (noting that the parties consented to trial before a Magistrate Judge).
32 Id (citing 42 USC § 2000e(b), which defines an employer
to include fifteen or more
employees).
" Arbaugh, 546 US at 509. The determination ultimately turned on whether truck
drivers and owners were considered employees for the purposes of Title VII. Id.
34 Id ("'[D]efendant's failure to qualify as an employer under Title VII deprives a
district court of subject matter jurisdiction.") (internal quotation marks omitted), citing
Dumas u Mt Vernon, 612 F2d 974, 980 (5th Cir 1980).
" Arbaugh, 546 US at 509.
1
Id at 516.
1
Id at 514-15.
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jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.
But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation
on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. 38
Throughout the opinion, the Court compared the
numerosity requirement to the amount-in-controversy threshold
for diversity jurisdiction. 39 There, Congress was clear that
meeting
the
minimum
amount-in-controversy
was
a
requirement for diversity jurisdiction. 4 0 On the other hand,
"neither 28 USC § 1331, nor Title VII's jurisdictional provision,
42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(3), specifies any threshold ingredient."4 1
Indeed, the employee-numerosity requirement only appeared in
the Definitions section of Title VII. 4 2 Therefore, the Court had
no trouble applying the "readily administrable bright line" to
hold that the numerosity requirement was not jurisdictional. 43
Lower courts have applied this bright line to hold that
requirements for bringing a Title VII claim are nonjurisdictional.4 4
Shortly after Arbaugh, the Court declined to apply the
"bright line" rule when holding that the timely filing of a notice
of appeal in a civil case was jurisdictional.4 5 In Bowles v
Russell,4 6 the Court considered whether the Sixth Circuit had
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a civil action that was filed
after the period allowed by statute.4 7 The plaintiff, after being
convicted of murder in state court, brought a civil action for
"' Id at 515-16 (internal citations

and footnote omitted).
Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16.
40 Id at 515, citing 28 USC § 1332 (providing an amount-in-controversy
requirement
for diversity jurisdiction).
41 Arbaugh, 546 US at 515 (noting that the numerosity
requirement appears in a
different provision that does not speak to jurisdictional terms), citing Zipes, 455 US at
394.
42 42 USC §
2000e.
43 Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16.
44 See, for example, Kaiser v Trofholz Technologies, Inc, 935 F Supp 2d 1286, 1292
(MD Ala 2013) (finding that the defendant's status as the plaintiffs employer is a nonjurisdictional element of the substantive cause of action); Smith v Angel FoodMinistries,
Inc, 611 F Supp 2d 1346, 1351 (MD Ga 2009) (holding that the religious exemption in
Title VII is non-jurisdictional in character).
4' Bowles u Russell, 551 US 205, 213 (2007).
46 551 US 205
(2007).
39

47

Id at 207.
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habeas relief that was denied by the district court.4 8 After
missing the 30-day limit to appeal that was provided by 28 USC
§ 2107(a), the plaintiff moved to extend the filing period.4 9 The
district court granted the extension, and the Sixth Circuit
ultimately dismissed for jurisdictional deficiencies. 5 0
The Supreme Court narrowly affirmed, holding "that the
timely filing of a notice to appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement."5 1 The Court examined the statute but relied more
heavily on the Court's prior case law, 52 considering it "well
settled that failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the
jurisdiction of a court of appeals."53 The Court distinguished
Arbaugh by pointing out that the employee-numerosity
requirement in that case was different from the time limit in the
instant case.5 4 The Court also offered a policy justification for
treating the time limit as jurisdictional, explaining that
"[b]ecause Congress decides whether federal courts can hear
cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what
conditions, federal courts can hear them."5 5
Four justices dissented because they considered the time
limit to be precisely the type of claim-processing rule that should
be treated as non-jurisdictional.5 6 The dissent argued that
statutory time limits are not automatically jurisdictional.5 7
Instead, pursuant to the Arbaugh "bright line," a time limit
should only be considered jurisdictional if Congress specifically

48

49

Id.
Id at 207-08.

5o Bowles, 551 US at 207-08. The specific jurisdictional issue arose because the
district court judge "inexplicably" gave the plaintiff an extension of seventeen days,
rather than the fourteen days permitted by 28 USC § 2107(c)(2). Id at 207.
31 Id at 214.
32 Id at 209 ("This Court has long held that the taking
of an appeal within the

prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.") (internal quotation marks omitted),
citing Griggs v Provident Consumer Discount Co, 459 US 56, 61 (1982), Hohn v United
States, 524 US 236, 247 (1998), Torres v Oakland Scavenger Co, 487 US 312, 314-15
(1988), and other cases.
5
Bowles, 551 US at 210, quoting Charles Alan Wright, et al, 15A Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3901 at 6 (2d ed).
54 Bowles, 551 US at 211 (Souter dissenting) (distinguishing Bowles from the series
of recent Supreme Court decisions which sought to clarify the distinction between nonjurisdictional requirements and jurisdictional prerequisites). The Court provided little
reasoning to support this distinction.
Id at 212-13 (Souter dissenting).
5
Id at 218 (Souter dissenting).
5
Id at 217 (Souter dissenting).
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articulates it as such.5 8 For the dissent, Bowles is a particularly
good candidate for equitable discretion: the plaintiff missed the
deadline because the judge gave him the wrong due date. 59
However, the plaintiffs reliance on the statements of the district
court judge ended up costing him his appeal when the Court
held the time limit to be jurisdictional based on prior case law.
The Court made this ruling even though it sidestepped more
recent cases, notably Arbaugh, to reach that result. The irony of
the Court's reasoning was not lost on the dissent:
In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a
District Court Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one
may depend on the recent, repeated, and unanimous
statements of all participating Justices of this Court. Yet
more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the
Court, along with two [to three] of our cases, are
jettisoned in a ruling for which the leading justification
is stare decisis. . . .co
The dissent's frustration highlights confusion in the case
law: what is the appropriate standard to determine
jurisdictional prerequisites? Arbaugh presents a "readily
administrable bright line" based on clear statutory language.
Bowles stands for the importance of consistent jurisprudence on
the topic, even if the statutory language is not clear. The Court
has tried to settle this confusion in more recent cases.
In Reed Elsevier, Inc v Muchnick, 6 1 the Court reconciled
Arbaugh and Bowles. 62 The Court, basing its reasoning on
Arbaugh, found that the presence of the word "jurisdiction" in
the statute did not sufficiently indicate that the registration
requirement is jurisdictional. 63 Similar to the statute in
Arbaugh, this text was in a separate section from the one

Bowles, 551 US at 217 (Souter dissenting).
Id at 207. For a discussion of the implications this decision has on the fairness of
the judicial system, see David S. Kantrowitz, Note, Caveat Emptor: JurisdictionalRules,
Bowles v. Russell, and Reliance on Our Judicial System, 89 BU L Rev 265 (2009)
(arguing that the unjust result in Bowles could be remedied by legislative action to give
judges more discretion).
6o Bowles, 551 US at 220 (Souter dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
58
59

61

559 US 154 (2010).

Id at 167-68 (holding that the Copyright Act's requirement that copyright
holders register their works before suing for infringement is non-jurisdictional).
61 Id at 164.
62
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granting courts jurisdiction.64 Additionally, the Court rejected
the argument that Bowles commanded a different result. Amicus
argued that a condition should be treated as jurisdictional if
consistently treated as jurisdictional by courts without
interruption by Congress-even in the absence of clear statutory
language suggesting jurisdictional treatment. 65 On the contrary,
"Bowles stands for the proposition that context, including [the]
Court's interpretation of similar provisions in many years past,
is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as
jurisdictional." 66 Thus, the Court found the Bowles emphasis on
prior case law to be consistent with the Arbaugh emphasis on
legislative language.6 7
These opinions provide guidance for lower courts seeking to
determine whether a requirement is jurisdictional. Recognizing
the importance of such determinations, the Court set a stringent
standard for jurisdictional requirements. Part II will
demonstrate the development of the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional treatment of Title VII's exhaustion requirements.
This discussion will illustrate the circuit split over presentment,
which this Comment suggests is resolved by the Court's recent
jurisdiction jurisprudence.
II. TITLE VII
The circuits are split as to whether presentment constitutes
a jurisdictional prerequisite or a non-jurisdictional condition
precedent for bringing a suit under Title VII. Lower courts have
generally required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit. Specifically, courts
have required timeliness, receipt of a right-to-sue notice, and
presentment. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the

64 Id at
164-65 ("[N]either [28 USC] § 1331, which confers subject-matter
jurisdiction ... nor [28 USC] § 1338(a), which is specific to copyright claims, conditions
its jurisdictional grant on [the registration requirement].").
6' Reed Elsevier, 559 US at 167. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas effectively
rejected an argument he laid out in a Bowles footnote. See Bowles, 551 US at 209 n 2
("[I]t is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as
jurisdictional in American law for well over a century. . . . Given the choice between
calling into question some dicta in our recent opinions and effectively overruling a
century's worth of practice, we think the former option is the only prudent course.").
66 Reed Elsevier, 559 US at 167 (explaining that Bowles examined statutory
language and Supreme Court jurisprudence to rank the requirement as jurisdictional).
£7 Id.
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statutory time limit for filing charges under Title VII is not
jurisdictional. 68 However, because the Supreme Court limited its
decision to timeliness, lower courts are divided as to the proper
treatment of the other two requirements. The circuit split on
presentment remains active, even in light of the Court's recent
decisions regarding jurisdiction.
A.

Timeliness

The Supreme Court has held that timeliness, Title VII's
requirement that charges be brought within 180-days of an
unlawful employment practice, 69 is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court. 70 As the only controlling
precedent on Title VII exhaustion requirements, this important
ruling is often consulted for determinations of other questions
related to exhaustion.

In Zipes v Trans World Airlines, Inc,71 female flight
attendants brought a class action against employer-airline
alleging unlawful sex discrimination. The class plaintiffs
claimed that the airline's policy of grounding female flight
attendants who became mothers, but not male flight attendants
who became fathers, violated Title VII. 7 2 The district court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed on the airline's liability.73 However, the
appellate court limited the holding to those plaintiffs who were
terminated within Title VII's timeliness requirement, even
though the defendant-employer did not plead the affirmative
defense.7 4 It did so because the Seventh Circuit declared the
timeliness requirement to be jurisdictional.

68

Zipes, 455 US at 393.

69
70

42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1).

72

Id at 388.

Zipes, 455 US at 393 (holding that the statutory time limit for filing a Title VII
claim with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional requirement for bringing a civil action). Title
VII boasts several time requirements. This case considered the time limit for initiating
an action with the EEOC after the occurrence of a violating offense. Id at 387.
7
455 US 385 (1982).
Id at 389 (summarizing the proceedings in the lower courts).
In re ConsolidatedPretrialProceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F2d 1142, 115051 (7th Cir 1978) ("We hold the 90-day filing period to be jurisdictional and therefore the
employer's failure to plead it did not constitute a waiver.").
7

74
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The Seventh Circuit held that the 90-day requirement7 5 is
jurisdictional-rather than in the nature of a statute of
limitations-due in part to the clear statutory language.7 6
Reading the statute, the panel found "nothing of significance to
indicate the 90-day filing requirement is not jurisdictional." 77
Additionally, the panel noted its decision was in accord with
prior Supreme Court jurisprudence that described the
requirement as jurisdictional.7 8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory
time limit for filing charges under Title VII was not
jurisdictional.79 Rather than looking for reasons why the
requirement was not jurisdictional, the Court shifted the
presumption by emphasizing an absence of signals that it was
jurisdictional.8 0 Pointing to the structure of Title VII, the Court
noted that the provisions discussing timeliness are separated
from those discussing jurisdiction of the federal courts.8 1 Next,
the Court explained that prior case law supported the holding.82
7
Title VII was amended in 1972 to extend the filing period from 90 days to 180
days, but the extension did not have retroactive effect on this suit. Airline Cases, 582
F2d at 1148 n 10.
7
Id at 1151 ("The language of the statute is clear: A charge under subsection (a) of
this section shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred."), quoting 42 USC § 2000e-5(d).
7
Airline Cases, 562 F2d at 1151.
78 Id, citing United Air Lines, Inc v Evans, 431 US 553, 555 n 4 (1977) ("Timely
filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action."); Alexander v GardnerDenver Co, 415 US 36, 47 (1974) (holding that an employee's resort to a collective
bargaining agreement's grievance-arbitration process does not waive Title VII remedies);
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 798 (1973) ("Respondent satisfied the
jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action [ ] by filing timely charges."). However, it
appears that only McDonnell Douglas actually describes Title VII's timeliness
requirement as jurisdictional.
79 Zipes, 455 US at 393 ("We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement
that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.").
80

Id at 392-93.

Id at 393-94 (noting that 42 USC §§ 2000e-5(e)-(f) do not limit jurisdiction to
those cases that met the timely filing requirement). See also id at 394-95 (analyzing
legislative history that associates the filing provision with a period of limitations).
81

82

Zipes, 455 US at 395-97, citing Franks v Bowman TransportationCo, 424 US 747

(1976) (refusing to deny relief for unnamed class members who had not filed
administrative charges with the EEOC); Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405
(1975) (making the same refusal); Love u Pullman Co, 404 US 522 (1972) (rejecting a
technical reading for a filing provision under Title VII because the scheme's process is
initiated by laymen); Intl Union of Electrical,Radio, and Machine Workers v Robbins &
Myers, Inc, 429 US 229 (1976) (denying argument that timely-filing requirement should
be tolled while the plaintiff pursued grievance procedure set forth in a collectivebargaining agreement); Mohasco Corp v Silver, 447 US 807 (1980) (neglecting to dismiss
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The Court dismissed prior descriptions of the timely-filing
requirement as jurisdictional because the "legal character of the
requirement was not at issue in those cases." 83 Finally, the
Court reasoned that treating the filing period as a requirement
subject to waiver and tolling accords with the remedial purpose
of Title VII, "without negating the particular purpose of the
filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."8 4
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Zipes, lower courts
have permitted waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling of the
statutory filing requirement.8 5 To this day, Zipes is the only
Supreme Court decision addressing whether or not a Title VII
exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. It thus provides
important guidance for any court addressing presentment. 86
However, while the Supreme Court explicitly ruled on
timeliness, the Court did not address either the right-to-sue
notice or presentment. Therefore, each requirement deserves its
own inquiry.
B.

Right-to-Sue Notice

Title VII permits a private party to bring a civil action for
unlawful employment discrimination against a respondent
named in an EEOC charge, provided that the party brought the
suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice from the

an action sua sponte on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the
plaintiff failed to comply with the timely filing requirement); and other cases.
"' Zipes, 455 US at 395 (explaining that the requirement was more often referred to
as a limitations statute).
84 Id at
398.
"8 See, for example, Bergbauer v Mabus, 934 F Supp 2d 55, 68 (DDC 2013) (waiving
defense of a different, yet related, Title VII timely filing requirement); Chin v Port
Authority of New York & New Jersey, 685 F3d 135, 146 n 6 (2d Cir 2012) (permitting a
claim brought 181 days, rather than 180 days, after the employee's termination because
the parties miscalculated and the 1-day difference was not material); Sayre v Pharmacy
Corp of America, 2010 WL 4638597, *3 (SD Miss) (refusing a timely filing defense
against a plaintiff who missed the filing deadline due to the closure of the filing office).
But see Lyons v England, 307 F3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir 2002) ("To establish federal
subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative
remedies before seeking adjudication of a Title VII claim. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies . . . requires that the complainant file a timely charge with the EEOC.");
Prairie View A & M University v Chatha, 381 SW3d 500, 524 (Tex 2012) (Jefferson
dissent) (criticizing the majority for effectively holding Title VII's timely filing
requirement to be jurisdictional for government employers).
86 See, for example, Francis, 235 F3d at 763 (relying on Zipes
to hold that failure to
bring any claim before the EEOC is not a jurisdictional bar to seeking recovery in the
district courts).
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EEOC. 87 In accordance with the statute, courts have dismissed
actions in which plaintiffs do not demonstrate the issuance of a
right-to-sue letter by the EEOC.8 8
Though the right-to-sue notice is a statutory requirement,
courts are not in agreement as to whether to treat it as
jurisdictional in nature. The Second Circuit, for example, has
interpreted Zipes and prior circuit precedent to hold that all
administrative exhaustion requirements are prerequisites
rather than jurisdictional requirements.8 9 The Ninth Circuit has
specifically indicated that a right-to-sue notice is not
jurisdictional.90 On the other hand, a district court in the Ninth
Circuit recently explained, in spite of fairly clear circuit
precedent, that a plaintiff must initiate suit after receipt of a
right-to-sue notice in order to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction.9 1 Although the right-to-sue notice is not the focus of
this Comment, the disagreement over whether to treat this
prerequisite as jurisdictional in many ways resembles the circuit
split over the presentment requirement.
C.

Presentment

Circuits are split regarding whether presentment is a
jurisdictional requirement for bringing suit under Title VII.
Administrative exhaustion requires a party to adequately
present an issue to an agency before seeking judicial review. 92
Unlike timeliness and the right-to-sue notice, presentment is not
explicitly defined in Title VII. The relevant portion of Title VII
reads:
87 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1) (identifying, in addition, the conditions
that lead to such
notice and the initial responses of a district court).
See, for example, Daoud v City of Wilmington, 894 F Supp 2d 544, 555-56 (D Del
2012) (noting that the plaintiff cannot simultaneously seek relief in the EEOC and the
district court at the same time). See generally Saunders v Mills, 842 F Supp 2d 284
(DDC 2012); Tani v FPL/Next Era Energy, 811 F Supp 2d 1004 (D Del 2011).
89 Francis, 235 F3d at 768 ("[A]s a
general matter, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is a precondition to bringing a Title VII claim in federal court,
rather than a jurisdictional requirement.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Surrell v California Water Service Co, 518 F3d 1097, 1104-05 (9th Cir 2008)
("Failure to obtain a federal right-to-sue letter does not preclude federal jurisdiction.").
91 Gao v Hawaii Dept of Atty Gen, 2010 WL 99355, at *2 (D Hawaii) (dismissing
employment discrimination claim because the plaintiff failed to bring suit within the
statutory time limit imposed after receiving right-to-sue notice).
92 Charles Alan Wright and Charles H. Koch, Jr, 33
Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 8389 (1st ed).
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If a charge filed with the [EEOC] is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days
from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any
period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this
section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed
a civil action under this section . . . or the Commission

has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which
the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall

so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days
after the giving of such notice a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge [ ]
by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . by the alleged

unlawful employment practice.

93

Although it is not explicitly defined, presentment follows
logically from the text. The statute permits claimants to bring
civil actions upon receipt of a right-to-sue notice.9 4 Receipt of
that notice is contingent upon a charge having completed the
administrative process for one or another reason. 95 It follows
that the ability to bring a civil action is contingent upon having
brought a charge before the EEOC. Moreover, that charge is tied
to a party affected by an "alleged unlawful employment
practice." 96 Thus, a civil action is not authorized if it arises out
of an unlawful employment practice unrelated to the charge that
completed the administrative process.9 7 But the statutory
language says nothing about the content of that charge
compared to the civil action. Therefore, presentment is an
implied or judicially created requirement.9 8
Several courts have held that a party is not entitled to
judicial review of an issue that was not presented during the
administrative proceedings.9 9 However, the Supreme Court has
93 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).
94 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also Part I.B.2.
9' 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).
96

42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).

But see Macfarlane, 21 Geo Mason Civ Rts L J at 248 (classifying presentment as
a meaningless exercise) (cited in note 24).
98 For a discussion of whether a court should impose a non-jurisdictional exhaustion
requirement, see Sims v Apfel, 530 US 103, 106-12 (2000) (holding that courts should
not require exhaustion in non-adversarial proceedings, such as those before the Social
Security Administration).
99 See, for example, Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v Aragan,
329 US 143, 155 (1946); Public Citizen, Inc v US EPA, 343 F3d 449, 461 (5th Cir 2003)
97
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held that presentment is jurisdictional in some circumstances
and that it is a non-jurisdictional prerequisite in others. 100 In
the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance, the circuits are
split as to whether presentment is a jurisdictional requirement
under Title VII. 101

1.

Multiple circuits have held that presentment is not a
jurisdictional requirement.

Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that
presentment is not a jurisdictional requirement for bringing suit
under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit held in Babrocky v Jewel
Food Co102 that presentment is not jurisdictional, but rather
akin to a condition precedent. 103 In Babrocky, the plaintiffs filed
a complaint against their supermarket-employer and union
alleging unlawful sex discrimination because job classifications
were sex segregated. 104 The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants on some counts and dismissed
others for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claims
were not included in the original EEOC charge. 105 The Seventh
Circuit reversed the dismissal and provided a thorough analysis
of why presentment is not jurisdictional. 106

('Absent exceptional circumstances, a party cannot judicially challenge agency action or
grounds not presented to the agency at the appropriate time during the administrative
proceeding."). See also Coalition for Government Procurement v Federal Prison
Industries, Inc, 365 F3d 435, 462 (6th Cir 2004) (explaining that under the
administrative waiver doctrine, "it is inappropriate for courts ... to consider arguments
not raised before the administrative agency involved").
'00 Compare Woelke & Romero Framing,Inc v NLRB, 456 US 645, 665-66 (1982)
(vacating part of appellate court's opinion regarding lawfulness of union picketing for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction), with Sims, 530 US at 106 (noting that issue
exhaustion is non-jurisdictional).
1'0 It
is noteworthy that many of the cases cited in this section include
discrimination claims against the government. Employment discrimination claims
against the federal government were authorized by an amendment to Title VII in 1972,
and are governed by 42 USC § 2000e-16. Some may argue that these claims warrant
different treatment, however the amended statute explicitly relies on procedural
elements introduced in § 2000e-5. Therefore, this Comment will evaluate all claims
under the procedural requirements of § 2000e-5.
102 773 F2d 857 (7th Cir
1985).
'os Id at 863-64.
104 Id at
860.
10
106

Id at 859 (summarizing lower court proceedings).
Babrocky, 773 F2d at 863-64.
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The court began by comparing presentment to the
timeliness requirement addressed by Zipes. 10 7 Timeliness is
central to the statutory scheme because it enables the EEOC to
pursue settlement through conferences, conciliation, and
persuasion before a lawsuit is filed.10 8 However, noting the
remedial nature of Title VII, the court cautioned that technical
constructions should be avoided and when appropriate,
equitable considerations should be incorporated. 109 Presentment,
like timeliness, gives the EEOC the opportunity to seek
conciliation and voluntary compliance and provides notice of the
charge to the charged party. 110 Therefore, if timeliness is not
jurisdictional, then neither is presentment.111
The court then showed how presentment differs from more
common elements of subject matter jurisdiction.112 The primary
distinction raised is that subject matter jurisdiction typically
can be determined facially, whereas presentment always entails
"an inquiry beyond the face of the complaint into the legal
characterizations" that surround the factual allegations in the
charge. 113 Based on this and the above reasoning, the court
concluded that presentment is akin to a condition precedent,
rather than a jurisdictional requirement.1 14 The court then
applied the "like or reasonably related" test to determine that
plaintiff's allegations of discrimination were sufficiently within
the scope of the EEOC charge brought based on sex segregated
classifications. 115
The Seventh Circuit later reiterated the Babrocky rule in

Cheek v Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, 116
where it held that an unlawful sexual harassment claim was not
107

Id at 863.

Id (internal citations omitted).
Id at 863, citing Zipes, 455 US at 393, 397-398.
110 Babrocky, 773 F2d at 863.
n. Id ("The Supreme Court's directive that the requirement of timeliness is not
strictly jurisdictional implies that the requirement of scope should be similarly
interpreted.").
112 Id at 863-64.
10

109

113 Id.
114 Babrocky, 773 F2d at 864 ("So characterizing the
requirement recognizes the
similarity between this [and the timeliness requirement], and gives full force to the
concerns regarding the remedial nature of Title VII and its underlying Congressional
policy.").

n. Id at 865.

n1 31 F3d 497 (7th Cir 1994).
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within the scope of the hostile work environment charge the
plaintiff brought to the EEOC. 117 Again, the court emphasized
that "allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the
ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would frustrate the EEOC's
investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the
charged party of notice of the charge."11 8 The court also echoed
Babrocky by adding that-in determining whether a claim is
included in or reasonably related to an EEOC chargesignificant leeway should be offered to Title VII plaintiffs, who
are typically laypersons. 119 Courts in the Seventh Circuit have
recently applied these standards to permit or refuse
discrimination claims on non-jurisdictional grounds. 120
Also recently, the Sixth Circuit held that presentment is not
a jurisdictional requirement under Title VII. In Adamov v US

Bank National Association,12 1 the plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging unlawful discharge due to national origin and
retaliation for complaints of discrimination. 12 2 The plaintiff's
complaint included both the national origin and retaliation
claims, however, a draft complaint submitted to the district
court prior to its filing omitted the retaliation claim. 123 Raising
jurisdiction sua sponte, the district court dismissed the

117

Id at 505.

Id at 500 (noting that although not jurisdictional, the presentment requirement
is critical).
119 Id, citing Taylor v Western and Southern Life Ins Co, 966 F2d 1188, 1195 (7th Cir
1992). See also Babrocky, 773 F2d at 864 (stating that the like or reasonably related
standard should be a "liberal one in order to effectuate the remedial purposes of Title
VII, which itself depends on lay persons, often unschooled, to enforce its provisions");
Duncan v Delta Consolidated Industries, Inc, 371 F3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir 2004)
("[C]ourts should not use Title VII's administrative procedures as a trap for unwary pro
se civil-rights plaintiffs.") (internal citation omitted).
120 See generally Lavalais v Village of Melrose Park, 734 F3d 629 (7th Cir 2013)
(permitting denial of transfer claim which was reasonably related to the plaintiffs
EEOC charge); Moses v USW Local Union 1014, 2013 WL 2177577 (ND Ind) (granting
summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiffs complaint alleged a new
theory of liability); O'Leary v Will County Sheriffs Office, 2013 WL 158056 (ND Ill)
(granting motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs allegations were not reasonably
related to the EEOC charge).
121 726 F3d 851 (6th Cir 2013).
122 Id at
852.
123 Id at 853-54. This case followed an unusual procedure,
reaching the district court
on diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state-law discrimination claims. The plaintiff
subsequently filed an EEOC complaint pursuant to Title VII and received a right-to-sue
letter, however, it appears that the district court only considered a draft complaint that
Adamov filed to avert preemption issues. Id.
11
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plaintiffs retaliation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because it was not exhausted. 124
The Sixth Circuit reversed, explaining that "where a
plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies, a district
court may not dismiss the claim on jurisdictional grounds." 12 5
This shift in circuit precedent was directly attributed to the
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence with regards to
jurisdiction. Following the Court's decision in Arbaugh, the
Sixth Circuit held in Adamov that Congress did not speak in
jurisdictional terms with regards to its presentment
requirement. 126 This application will be explored in greater
detail in Part III.B.
2.

Several circuits have held that presentment is a
jurisdictional requirement.

The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that
presentment is a jurisdictional requirement. In Alfano u
Costello,127 the Second Circuit considered whether a plaintiff's
claim that her termination constituted unlawful sex
discrimination was reasonably related to the conduct alleged in
the initial charge brought before the EEOC. 128 The panel
explained as follows:
Jurisdiction exists over Title VII claims only if they have
been included in an EEOC charge, or are based on
conduct subsequent to the EEOC charge which is
reasonably related to that alleged in the EEOC charge. 12 9
The court then reviewed the district court's analysis and
affirmed dismissal of the termination claim. Despite the contrast
with the prior and more general Second Circuit precedent,

124

Id.
Adamov, 726 F3d at 853-54, citing Hill v Nicholson, 383 Fed Appx 503, 508 (6th
Cir 2010) (explaining that presentment is not jurisdictional, despite contrary circuit
precedent).
126 726 F3d at
853-54.
127 294 F3d 365 (2d
Cir 2002).
128 Id at 381. This panel's decision appears to contradict
another Second Circuit
panels decision in Francis, discussed in Part II.B.
129 Alfano, 294 F3d at 381 (internal quotations omitted)
(noting that such inquiry
may require evidence of the breadth of the EEOC investigation).
125
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district courts have taken presentment to be a jurisdictional
requirement. 130
Prior cases in the Second Circuit considered the
jurisdictional treatment of presentment as an essential element
of Title VII's statutory scheme. 1 31 As the court saw it, permitting
a plaintiff to litigate a claim not previously presented to and
investigated by the EEOC would defeat efforts to encourage
settlement through conciliation and voluntary compliance. 132
The Ninth Circuit has also explained that presentment is a
jurisdictional requirement to bringing a civil action in federal
court. 133 In B.K.B. u Maui Police Dept, 134 the court reviewed a
district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 135 The plaintiff filed an EEOC charge indicating she
had been subjected to discrimination based on race, sex, and
national origin, and that she had been subject to harassment,
but she did not sufficiently develop facts to support the charges.
In her complaint to the federal court, the plaintiff made
allegations of sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The
defendant challenged the EEOC charge as insufficient to
support these claims. 136 The district court dismissed these
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the
sexual harassment claims. 137

"s See Figueroa v Napolitano, 2012 WL 3683558, *3 (EDNY) (refusing to permit
amendment of complaint because a plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction for new,
specific allegations with generalized claims of discrimination in original EEOC
complaint); Shub v Westchester Community College, 2008 WL 1957731, *5 (SDNY)
(asserting jurisdiction because subsequent conduct was reasonably related to the conduct
in EEOC charge); Sigmon v Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F Supp 667, 675
(SDNY 1995) (limiting jurisdiction of district court to those claims properly presented to
EEOC).
.s.Butts v City of New York Dept of Housing Preservationand Development, 990 F2d
1397, 1401 (2d Cir 1993) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Butts was criticized
for its careless use of jurisdictional terms by the Franciscourt, however Butts was cited
as authoritative two years later in Alfano.
132 Miller v International Telephone and Telegraph Corp, 755 F2d 20, 26 (2d Cir
1985) (highlighting the importance of presentment as a notice provision that encourages
conciliation and voluntary compliance).
lss
See Lyons v England, 307 F3d 1092 (9th Cir 2002); B.KB. v Maui Police Dept,
276 F3d 1091 (9th Cir 2002).
134 276 F3d 1091 (9th Cir 2002).
ls.

Id at 1099.

16

Id at 1100-01.
Id at 1099.
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On review, the Ninth Circuit first affirmed that exhaustion
and presentment are requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction. 138 The court then reversed the district court's
dismissal because the language of EEOC charges is to be
construed "with the utmost liberality." 139 With that in mind, the
court read the EEOC charge such that "harassment"
incorporated racial and sexual harassment that appeared in her
complaint. 140 Another Ninth Circuit panel subsequently cited
B.K.B. to explain that presentment is jurisdictional. 141
More recently, the Ninth Circuit held in Brown v Hawaii
Department of Public Safetyl42 that the district court did not
have jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to meet the
presentment requirement. 143 In this case, the court did not offer
a liberal construction of the EEOC charge because the plaintiff
was represented by an attorney throughout the process. 144 In the
absence of such a construction, the claims were outside of the
EEOC charge and the complaint was dismissed.1 4 5 Subsequent
district court opinions treated presentment as jurisdictional but
applied a liberal standard to enforce the requirement upon
layperson litigants.1 4 6
The Tenth Circuit has also held that administrative
exhaustion,
including presentment,
is a jurisdictional
requirement to bringing a claim in federal court. 147 Announcing
"s B.KB., 276 F3d at 1100 ("Subject matter jurisdiction extends over all allegations
of discrimination that either fell within the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or
an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Interestingly,
the court cited Babrocky to support the importance of exhaustion, which the Ninth
Circuit considers jurisdictional.
19 Id at 1100 (internal quotation omitted).
140 Id at
1103.
141 Lyons, 307 F3d at 1103 (reversing district court dismissal
because the plaintiff's
allegations were well within the scope of the EEOC charge).
142 446 Fed Appx 70 (9th
Cir 2011).
143 Brown u Hawaii Departmentof Public Safety, 446
Fed Appx 70, 73 (9th Cir 2011).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See generally Cohen u Clark County School Dist,
2012 WL 2326721 (D Nev)
(dismissing for failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction because gender based
discrimination claim was not sufficiently related to EEOC charge of retaliation); Padilla
v Bechtel Construction Co, 2007 WL 1219737 (D Ariz 2007) (granting motion to dismiss
because amended complaint was not reasonably related to allegations in the EEOC
charge); Oshilaja u Watterson, 2007 WL 2903029 (D Ariz 2007) (granting motion to
dismiss for the same reason).
147 Jones u Runyon, 91 F3d 1398,
1398 (10th Cir 1996).
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the principle in Jones v Runyon,14 8 the court included a lengthy
footnote detailing the circuit split regarding treatment of
exhaustion following Zipes.14 9 As explored above, the court noted
that some circuits expanded the Zipes holding to exhaustion
requirements beyond timeliness. 150 The court also pointed to
circuits that consider administrative exhaustion to be
jurisdictional. 15 1 Then, the court addressed its own precedent,
noting that, while timely filing may not be jurisdictional, the
requirement of an EEOC filing is. 1 52 That precedent treated
presentment as jurisdictional to encourage conciliation and
reduce the burden on federal courts, and to allow the EEOC to
develop a record, use its expertise, and exercise its discretion. 153
Jones was decided before Arbaugh; however, in Dalvit U
United Airlines, Inc, 154 the Tenth Circuit applied the Jones
reasoning to hold that presentment is jurisdictional. 155 In Dalvit,
the plaintiffs sued employer-airline for discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff's complaint
alleged "numerous adverse actions not described in their EEOC
charge." 15 6 On review, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of these claims for lack of jurisdiction due to the
plaintiff's failure to exhaust the administrative remedy.15 7
District courts in the Tenth Circuit have also treated
presentment as a jurisdictional requirement for civil actions
against private employers. 158 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has
91 F3d 1398 (10th Cir 1996).
Id at 1399 n 1 (pointing out that the characterization was not dispositive in the
instant case).
"o Id, citing Temengil v Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 881 F2d 647, 654 (9th Cir
1989); Womble v Bhangu, 864 F2d 1212, 1213 (5th Cir 1989); Jackson v Seaboard Coast
Line RR Co, 678 F2d 992, 1005 (11th Cir 1982). But see B.KB, 276 F3d at 1091.
151 Jones, 91 F3d at 1399 n 1, citing Davis u North CarolinaDept of Correction, 48
F3d 134, 137-39 (4th Cir 1995); Bullard v Sercon Corp, 846 F2d 463, 468 (7th Cir 1988).
But see Babrocky, 773 F2d at 863-64.
152 Jones, 91 F3d at 1399 n 1.
..
s Harbisonu Goldschmidt, 693 F2d 115, 118 (10th Cir 1982).
114 359 Fed Appx 904 (10th Cir
2009).
148
149

...Id at 911.
156 Id.
117 Id (holding that a plaintiff may not cure a jurisdictional defect by pursuing
administrative remedies after filing suit).
"s See generally Bankston u Antlers Hilton Hotel, 2011 WL 6153024 (D Colo 2011)
(dismissing wrongful termination claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it
was not within the scope of an accommodation charge brought before the EEOC); Deuty v
HP, 2011 WL 2607169 (D Colo 2011) (dismissing claim for lack of subject matter

723]

CATCHING UP TO THE SUPREME COURT

745

continued to hold that exhaustion, including presentment, is a
jurisdictional requirement for bringing a Title VII claim. 15 9
In sum, courts are not in agreement as to the proper
treatment of the exhaustion requirements in Title VII.
Presentment, in particular, has created significant disagreement
among circuits. Part III suggests that this circuit split can be
resolved by applying the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
that brought clarity to the doctrine of jurisdiction.
III. THE ARBAUGH-BOWLES TEST
The Supreme Court's recent efforts to bring clarity to
jurisdiction doctrine spawned a two-factor test to determine
whether a prerequisite to bringing a suit ranks as
jurisdictional. 16 0 This test, which this Comment calls the
"Arbaugh-Bowles test," requires courts to look first for a clear
statutory indication that Congress wanted the rule to be
jurisdictional. Second, the court may consider context, including
prior interpretations of similar provisions. The circuits should
adopt the Arbaugh-Bowles test because it provides a better
method than those used by most of the circuits to determine
whether presentment is jurisdictional.
A.

Foundations of the Arbaugh-Bowles Test
This test is based, not surprisingly, on the holdings in

Arbaugh and Bowles, as reconciled by Reed Elsevier.161 It
instructs courts to look for a "clear" indication that Congress
wanted the rule to be jurisdictional ("Arbaugh factor"), taking
into account context, including prior interpretations of similar
provisions ("Bowles factor").1 62 The Court most recently applied

jurisdiction because it did not meet the presentment requirement).
19
See generally Freppon u City of Chandler, 528 Fed Appx 892 (10th Cir 2013)
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to
present wrongful termination claim that was not reasonably related to the pregnancy
discrimination charge brought before the EEOC).
160 But see Micah J. Revell, Comment, Prudential Standing, The Zone of Interests,
and the New Jurisprudenceof Jurisdiction,63 Emory L J 221, 250-51 (2013) (describing
the same factors as a three-step test).
16' Prior to Reed Elsevier, Arbaugh (statutory text) and Bowles (context) presented
two distinct methods of assessing jurisdiction. In Reed Elsevier, Justice Thomas (the
Bowles author) reconciled the decisions explaining that context is relevant, but not
dispositive. See Part I.C.
162 Henderson u Shinseki, 131 S Ct 1197, 1203 (2011) (holding
that a deadline for
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this test in Sebelius v Auburn Regional Medical Center,163 when
it held that a 180-day limit for health care providers to file an
administrative appeal from an initial determination of
reimbursement due to them was not jurisdictional. 164
In Auburn Regional, the Court first examined the statutory
language, finding that it did not suggest that Congress meant to
treat the requirement as jurisdictional. 165 Next, the Court
explained the importance of prior case law, which consistently
held filing deadlines to be non-jurisdictional.166 Additionally, the
Court provided guidance for weighing the two factors against
each other, explaining that only the exceptional case "with a
century's worth of precedent" can make a time limit
jurisdictional. 167 This demonstrates the dramatic context the
Court expects for the Bowles factor to outweigh the Arbaugh
factor. In other words, the Arbaugh factor dominates the test;
the Bowles factor is the rare exception.
B.

The Arbaugh-Bowles Test Should Replace Prior Circuit
Court Approaches

The Arbaugh-Bowles test is the best way to resolve the
circuit split for a number of reasons. First, and most
importantly, it is the appropriate application of binding
Supreme Court decisions. The Court's recent effort to bring
clarity to the doctrine of jurisdiction directly affects the question
of whether or not presentment is jurisdictional under Title VII.
Although decisions such as Arbaugh have yet to be applied in
this context by every circuit, courts are bound to do so going
forward. The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Adamov reflects
this.
Second, other methods used by the circuits are prone to
challenge. For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Babrocky presented the most exhaustive examination of the
issue. However, that decision relied too heavily on the Supreme

filing notice of appeal with the Veterans Court is non-jurisdictional).
16s 133 S Ct 817 (2013).
164 Id at 821-22.
161 Id at 824-25.
166 Id at 825 ("Key to our decision, we have repeatedly held that
filing deadlines
ordinarily are not jurisdictional; indeed, we have described them as quintessential claimprocessing rules.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
167 Auburn Regional, 133 S
Ct at 825.
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Court's decision in Zipes because, although timeliness is related
to presentment, the Court based much of its decision on
reasoning that does not apply to presentment. 168 On the other
hand, circuits that treated presentment as a jurisdictional
requirement
appear
to
have
conflated
jurisdictional
requirements with non-jurisdictional, yet still mandatory,
requirements. The Second and Tenth Circuits' shared rationale
for enforcing a strict presentment requirement-to encourage
conciliation-is persuasive. 169 However, the instant question is
not whether presentment should be discarded, but whether it
should be treated as jurisdictional. Those goals can still be
achieved with a non-jurisdictional presentment requirement
that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 170
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning can be challenged because it
likewise
does not compel jurisdictional treatment of
presentment. This circuit considers presentment to be
jurisdictional but maintains a liberal standard under which it
applies the requirement. 17 1 Although the circuits disagree on
whether presentment is jurisdictional, the Ninth Circuit's liberal
standard seems identical to treatment in the Seventh Circuit,
which does not consider presentment to be jurisdictional. 17 2
See, for example, Pacheco u Mineta, 448 F3d 783, 788 n 7 (5th Cir 2006) ("[T]he
reasoning in Zipes . . . relies heavily on legislative history and Supreme Court precedents
that characterize the filing deadlines as statutes of limitations."). Presentment is less of
a time requirement than it is a substantive requirement. While time requirements are
the typical example of claim-processing rules, substantive requirements are not so
clearly in that category. In this sense, presentment resembles Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)(6) which mandates the "clearly erroneous" standard for appellate review
of district court findings of fact. Both rules serve to protect the lower tribunal's ability to
resolve matters. Moreover, the two share similar goals of providing notice to opposing
parties and pushing adjudication to the administrative process. But presentment is also
focused on encouraging settlement and conciliation through voluntary compliance, a goal
that would be severely hindered if the plaintiff can hide charges during the
administrative process in anticipation of a sneak-attack in court.
169 See Part II.C.2 (recognizing the point that presentment is critical for encouraging
settlement through conciliation and voluntary compliance).
170 See Part I.B
(reviewing the implications of treating a requirement as
jurisdictional). In addition, a mandatory presentment rule would allow agencies to use
expertise, exercise discretion, and develop a record. This allays the Tenth Circuit's
second concern. See Part II.C.2.
171 See Part II.C.2.
172 Compare B.KB., 276 F3d at 1100 (permitting allegations
of sexual harassment
which reasonably relate to claims of sex, gender, national origin discrimination, and
harassment in an EEOC complaint), with Jenkins v Blue Cross Mutual Hospital
Insurance, Inc, 538 F2d 164, 167 (7th Cir 1976) (permitting allegations of sex
discrimination which reasonably relate to claims of race discrimination in an EEOC
complaint).
168
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Applying a liberal standard to evaluate presentment does not
correlate with the nature of a jurisdictional inquiry. Jurisdiction
is meant to be determined facially, not through exhaustive
consideration. 17 3 Such treatment is more appropriate in the
context of equitable consideration, which is prohibited for
matters that lack jurisdiction. In sum, each of these approaches
is imperfect. The most glaring problem, however, is that they do
not take into account relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence
from the last decade. The Arbaugh-Bowles test fixes that.
IV. APPLYING THE ARBAUGH-BOWLES TEST

Applying the Arbaugh-Bowles test resolves the circuit split
by determining that presentment is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Presentment, a non-statutory requirement, fails
the Arbaugh factor, which looks for a clear statement by
Congress making a requirement jurisdictional. It also fails the
Bowles factor, which demands extraordinarily consistent
treatment of similar provisions as jurisdictional. Indeed, a
recent Sixth Circuit decision implicitly used this test to hold
that presentment is not jurisdictional. Given the clarity of
Supreme Court precedent, other circuits are bound to follow
suit.
A.

Applying the Arbaugh-Bowles Test: the Arbaugh Factor

The first factor of the Arbaugh-Bowles test applies the
readily administrable bright line, which looks for a clear
statement by the legislature that a statute's scope should be
jurisdictional. 174 The Court purposely created a strict standard,
explaining that if Congress disagrees, it can amend the statute
and make the language clearer.1 75 Presentment does not meet
this stringent standard of clarity.
As a preliminary matter, the presentment requirement is
not made explicit in the statute. 176 The heightened Arbaugh
standard for jurisdictional requirements demands significantly
more clarity than an inferred prerequisite. 177 Finding otherwise
17s
174

17'
176
177

See Part II.C. 1, citing Babrocky, 773 F2d at 863-64.
Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16. See also Part I.C.
Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16.
See Part II.C.
Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16 (explaining the presumption that a requirement is
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would require stretching an interpretation in a manner that
Arbaugh prohibits. 178 Even absent that major hurdle, however,
presentment fails the other considerations typical for the
Arbaugh factor. Title VII's jurisdictional provision was designed
to be purposefully broad to grant access to the federal courts for
claims of employment discrimination. 179 According to the
Supreme Court, Title VII's grant of jurisdiction was designed
such that plaintiffs could circumvent the amount-in-controversy
requirement typical for federal question claims. 18 0 This broad
grant of jurisdiction conflicts with the jurisdictional treatment of
non-statutory prerequisites to bringing suit.
Moreover, Title VII's exhaustion requirements are
structurally separated from the statute's grant of jurisdiction.
Arbaugh emphasized that the employee-numerosity threshold
appears in a separate provision from the provision that provided
federal district courts' jurisdiction over Title VII claims. 181
Presentment, though not explicit in the text, stems from
language in 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)-(f)(1). These provisions do "not
speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the district courts." 1 82 Instead, jurisdiction is
granted in § 2000e-5(f)(3). The Court already rejected this
structural separation in Zipes, a case that the Arbaugh Court
relied upon in forming its standard. 183
Congress explicitly made presentment jurisdictional in
other labor statutes. Pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), "[n]o objection that has not been urged
before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court."18 4 The

Supreme Court held that this was a clear statement that
presentment was jurisdictional. 185 The Court also held that
similar language in the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) made

non-jurisdictional unless Congress clearly states that it should count as jurisdictional).
178
Id.
179 See id at
505-06.
180 Id (noting that when
Title VII was passed, 28 USC § 1331 had such a
requirement that was eliminated in 1980).
181 Arbaugh, 546 US at 505-06. See also Part I.C.
182 Arbaugh, 546
US at 515.
1ss See Part I.C. The timeliness requirement at issue in Arbaugh relies upon the
same statutory provisions as presentment.
184 29 USC §
160(e).

"s Woelke & Romero Framing,Inc u NLRB, 456 US 645, 666 (1982).
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presentment jurisdictional. 186 These comparisons illustrate the
heightened level of clarity that Congress seeks. They also
suggest that Congress knew how to make a requirement
jurisdictional if it wanted to.187 Clearly, Congress did not do that
in Title VII. Therefore, the presumption is that presentment is
not jurisdictional. 188
In sum, the Arbaugh factor looks for a clear statement by
Congress that a requirement is jurisdictional. Short of a clear
statement, presentment is not even mentioned in Title VII.
Treating such a rule as jurisdictional conflicts with Title VII's
broad grant of authority to district courts. Moreover, the
relevant provisions, from which the inference of presentment is
drawn, do not speak in jurisdictional terms and are separated
from the provision that grants jurisdiction. This treatment falls
well short of other presentment requirements in labor and
workforce statutes, which explicitly state that presentment is
jurisdictional. Therefore, presentment does not meet this
stringent standard.
B.

Applying the Arbaugh-Bowles Test: the Bowles Factor

The Bowles factor permits a court to consider context,
including prior court interpretations of similar provisions, to
determine whether a requirement is jurisdictional. Discussion of
context involves decisions on jurisdictional questions related to
other Title VII requirements and decisions on presentment in
other statutes. In the end, a review of this Supreme Court
jurisprudence falls well short of "a century's worth of precedent"
that would be required to declare presentment jurisdictional
absent a clear statement from Congress.18 9
The Supreme Court's rulings on other Title VII
prerequisites suggest that presentment is not jurisdictional.
First, the Court held in Zipes that timeliness is a nonjurisdictional
requirement.
Although
Zipes
can
be

EEOC u Federal Labor Relations Authority, 476 US 19, 23 (1986) (evaluating 5
which the Court found to be virtually identical to § 10(e) of the NLRA).
1s? The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed after the NLRA (1935)
and before the
CSRA (1978). This indicates that the clear statement of jurisdictional treatment was an
available tool for legislation related to labor and the workplace.
188 Arbaugh, 546 US at 515-16.
189 Auburn Medical, 133 S Ct at 825, citing Bowles, 551 US at 209 n 2.
1s6

USC

§ 7123(c),

723]

CATCHING

UP

TO THE SUPREME COURT

751

distinguished, 19 0 the bottom line is that presentment is also an
element of exhaustion, and therefore, the holding is
appropriately part of the Bowles inquiry. More recently, the
Court held in Arbaugh that employee-numerosity is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Although this was not an element of
exhaustion, it shows that the Court has typically not held Title
VII requirements to be jurisdictional. Together, these holdings
show an absence of the unequivocal precedent required for the
Court to rank a requirement jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court has also treated other judicially created
presentment requirements as non-jurisdictional. In Sims v
Apfel, 19 1 the Court considered whether a Social Security
claimant's failure to exhaust an issue in the administrative
appeals process waives judicial review. 192 Rejecting the entire
issue-exhaustion requirement, the Court noted in dicta that
even were a court-imposed issue -exhaustion requirement
proper, the Fifth Circuit erred in treating it as jurisdictional." 193
The Court explained that exhaustion requirements for
administrative proceedings are often justified by allusions to
appellate procedure.1 94 This is less persuasive in administrative
proceedings that are not adversarial, such as Social Security
proceedings.19 5 The distinction does not apply to EEOC
proceedings;19 6 however, it is sufficient that the Court dismissed
the jurisdictional treatment of issue exhaustion in dicta to
consider Sims as context for the presentment requirement.
The Bowles factor requires consistent Supreme Court
precedent demonstrating that provisions similar to Title VII's
presentment
requirement
have
been
interpreted
as
jurisdictional. Although comparisons to Zipes, Arbaugh, and
Sims are imperfect, the decisions sufficiently demonstrate an

190

See note 168 (distinguishing presentment from the timely filing requirement in

Zipes).
191
192

530 US 103 (2000).
Id at 106.

Id at 106 n 1.
Id at 109, citing Hormel v Helvering, 312 US 552 (1941).
195 Sims, 530 US at 110.
196 While the claimant's relationship with the EEOC
may not be adversarial, the
employer's relationship is. Thus, an EEOC proceeding is adversarial. See National
Casualty Co v Forge Industrial Staffing Inc, 567 F3d 871, 877 n 1 (7th Cir 2009) (noting
the adversarial nature of EEOC proceedings). But see Macfarlane, 21 Geo Mason Civ Rts
L J at 246 ("Like the proceedings before the Social Security Administration, a claimant's
relationship with the EEOC is not adversarial.") (cited in note 24).
193
194
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absence of consistent precedent. Therefore, it is clear that
presentment fails to meet the extraordinarily high standard
called for by Bowles. Title VII's presentment requirement thus
fails both factors of the Arbaugh-Bowles test. This test embodies
the Supreme Court's recent method for determining whether or
not a requirement is jurisdictional. Consequently, presentment
is not a jurisdictional requirement.
C.

The Arbaugh-Bowles Test in Practice: Adamov

The Sixth Circuit applied the Arbaugh-Bowles test, without
explicitly saying so, in Adamov to determine that presentment is
a non-jurisdictional requirement to bring a suit under Title
VII.197 This represented a shift in circuit precedent; however, the
Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Arbaugh warranted taking a
different approach. 198 The court applied the Arbaugh factor,
finding that the various parts of 42 USC § 2000e-5 that discuss
the EEOC process do not speak in jurisdictional terms.199 The
court then noted the "deliberately broad grant of access to
federal courts," which appears in a different provision than
those that discuss the EEOC process. 200 The court also applied
the Bowles factor, noting decisions in the Sixth and other
circuits since Arbaugh that have declined to treat exhaustion as
jurisdictional under Title VII. 20 1 The court concluded that Title
VII does not speak in jurisdictional terms and that the context
did not demand a different result. It therefore held that
presentment is a non-jurisdictional requirement. This decision,
though it did not explicitly say so, represents an application of

the Arbaugh-Bowles test.
V. CONCLUSION

The circuit split over whether or not presentment is
jurisdictional jeopardizes Title VII's goal of empowering

For a brief summary of the background of the case, see Part II.C.1.
198 See Hill v Nicholson, 383 Fed Appx 503, 508 (6th Cir 2010). See also note 125 and
accompanying text.
199 Adamov, 726 F3d at 856.
200 Id.
201 Id, citing Hill, 383 Fed Appx at 503; Vera v McHugh,
622 F3d 17, 29-30 (1st Cir
2010) (explaining that timeliness is not jurisdictional); Douglas v Donovan, 559 F3d 549,
556 n 4 (DC Cir 2009) (noting in dicta that exhaustion is not jurisdictional).
197
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layperson litigants to pursue relief. 202 The Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence clarifying the doctrine of jurisdiction,
however, allays that concern. The Court's recent decisions
formed a test that can, and should, be applied directly to this
question. Doing so leads to the conclusion that presentment is
not a jurisdictional requirement, but instead, a mandatory
prerequisite for bringing a suit that is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling. The other circuits should follow
the Sixth Circuit's lead and apply this test to presentment
issues going forward.

202

Loe u Heckler, 768 F2d 409, 417 (DDC 1985).

